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Abstract 
This article seeks to contribute to the study of political centralisation in Portugal 
under Salazar; focusing on the council of ministers and its decision-making role 
and exploring the links between the dictator and his ministers (1933-39). The 
authors discuss the centralist strategy of the dictator based on a quantitative and 
qualitative study of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's diaries: detailed accounts of his 
routines, audiences, meetings and even telephone calls. Our conclusions indicate 
Salazar perceived his cabinet more as a crisis management committee, as meet-
ings occurred irregularly and the agenda was considerably focused on internal 
and external crises and major international political events. The article also pro-
vides a more accurate notion of the main features of decision-making during the 
regime's institutionalisation by exploring Salazar's individual relations with his 
ministers and inner circle. As Salazarism is often compared to its Iberian coun-
terpart, Francoism. important differences between the two regimes in this domain 
are noted. 
Introduction 
The dictators of the 20th century exerted distinctive levels of politica l 
centralisation within their regimes: particularly among their ministerial 
elites. As a result, institutions were banished , diminished or empowered 
according to ru lers' conception of leadership and power sharing. In that 
sense, the composition and role of those same institutions represent 
important pieces of a larger puzzle: that of decision-making under dicta-
toria l regimes. 
This article seeks to cont ribute towards the study of political centralisa-
tion in Portugal under Salazarism, focusing on the council of ministers 
and its decision-making role, and exploring the links between the dictator 
and his ministers. Although the New State under Salazar's ru le lasted from 
1932 until 1968, this article focuses exclusively on the years of the 
regime's institutional isation. 








l. Salazar kept a detailed 
diary right up until 
1968. He kept a 
note of a significant 
part of the meet-
ings and telephone 
calls he received, 
and the names of 
people who missed 
appointments with 
him. Unfortunately, 
he did not keep a 
detailed account of 
the matters discussed 
at meetings. It is 
widely recognized 
that the first time his 
diary was used as a 
primary source was 
by Franco Nogueira, 
who published an 
official six-volume 
biography of Salazar 
during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Nogueira 
1977-1985). 
2. The former date is 
that on which the 
first government 
was formed after the 
promulgation of the 
1933 constitution; the 
second that on which 
the Spanish civil 
war officia.lly ended. 
The diaries for the 
period 16 August-31 
December 1933 
were not available. 
In respect of meet-
ings of the council 
of ministers, this 
chronolog ical lacuna 
was overcome by 
consulting press notes 
(AOS/CO/PC-8F, part 
1 [1932-194 0]). 
Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to over-
come this absence in 
relation to Salazar's 
meetings with politi-
cal leaders and other 
individuals. In this 
sense, the analysis 
of the frequency and 
topics debated in the 
council of ministers 
includes only April-
December 1933 and 
January-May 1939. It 
is important to bear in 
mind conclusions do 
not include the begin-
ning of the Second 
The authors discuss the centralist strategy of the dictator based on a 
quantitative and qualitative study of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar's diaries -
detailed accounts of his routines, audiences, meetings and even telephone 
calls.1 The quantitative analysis provides solid proof of the (ir)regularity of 
council of minister meetings and attests to the (ir)relevance Salazar attrib-
uted to this particular institution , as previous studies have sustained (Cruz 
1988; Pinto 2002). The qualitative analysis, on the other hand, reveals 
important aspects of the relationship between the dictator and the indi-
vidual ministers, which led the authors to rethink former general conclu-
sions about the centralisation of power under Salazar 's rule. Although the 
investigation covers only the period from April 1933 to May 1939, the 
dictator's diary facilitated a new look into the informal structures of power 
in Portugal during the first years of the New State. 2 
The article begins by providing an overview of the existing studies on 
the general features of the New State, and its relevance for under stand ing 
political centralisation and the role of the council of ministers after 1933. 
Based on the former, it focuses on the formal constitutional rules regulating 
the relationship between the prime minister and his cabinet, combining it 
with other contemporary sources. The core of the article then focuses on 
the actual practice of decision-making, using Salazar's personal note s as 
the major source for understanding collective and individual meetings with 
his ministers and inner-circle, including the frequency, political context and 
the political agenda of these meetings. The conclusions corroborate former 
interpretations , while also suggesting important nuances, which are of sig-
nificant relevance for understanding the personalisation of power during 
the first years of Salazar as Portugal's de facto dictator. 
What do we know about political-decision making 
in Portugal under Salazar? 
Most of the existing research on political decision-making under dictatorial 
regimes focuses on the person of the dictator and the type of leadership 
expressed through discourses and practices. However, less effort has been 
made to understanding different levels of political centralisation and power 
distribution by focusing on other political institutions created by, or for, 
these regimes. With respect to Salazarism this is even more striking: the first 
generic studies appeared in the late 1960s and 19 70s, and focused on the 
nature of the regime while representing some of the first attempts to com-
pare Salazarism with other 'fascist regimes' (Lucena 1976; Schmitter 1975; 
Cabral 1976 ; Cruz 1988). As a result, competing interpretations emerged, 
indicating that either Portugal was governed by some sort of 'fascism with-
out a movement' (Lucena 1976) or that 'not all authoritarianisms were 
fascist' (Cruz 1988; see Pinto 1995). Linz's seminal typology (1975) would 
later influence some of the more political and comparative interpretations 
of the New State, irreversibly classifying the regime as 'authoritarian' given 
certain of its features, such as its 'limited pluralism' (Pinto 1995). However, 
Linz's typology did not establish a direct link between regime type and the 
extent of the centralisation of decision-making. Although scholars agreed 
from the beginning that Salazarism could not be characterised as totalitar-
ian, considerable work had yet to be done in order to under stand the extent 
of power allocation by the 20th-century dictators, including Salazar. 
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From the 19 70s on, no more than occasional references to the level 
of political centralisation in Portugal can be found. One of the earliest 
references to the council of ministers provides a brief account 9f its role, 
based on a few statements by Salazar and his ministers (Cruz 1988) . 
Cruz classified the council of ministers as a system of vertical accounta-
bility based on a type of dictatorial 'rule of law'. 'Salazar listened to his 
ministers and collected the greatest amount of information possible 
about the topic of discussion ... but he kept the final decision-making 
responsibility to himself (Cruz 1988: 104). In a similar vein, one of the 
most recent contributions on the ministerial elites of the New State also 
concluded that: 
the dictator effectively eliminated the council of ministers, which was soon 
replaced by meetings with individual ministers. Cabinet meetings had become 
purely symbolic by the mid-1930s, only taking place when there were foreign 
and domestic policy problems deserving to be shared with the nation, or when 
there were important cabinet re-shuffies. 
(Almeida, Pinto and Bermeo 2003) 
As we shall see, this was not always the case. 
It appears the prevailing notion about Salazar's governing style has 
not changed much over time. 
While it would certainly be an exaggerat ion to claim Salazar created author-
itarian rule in Portugal tout seu1 et de toutes pieces, the evidence suggests he 
played a very personal and imperious role in both the direction of policy 
after 19 2 8 and in the backing of elites after 19 3 2. 
(Schmitter 1975: 52) 
As research continues, we hope new studies on other instances of Salazarist 
decision-making will provide new insights and a more holistic interpreta-
tion of the New State's decision-making process. Our contribution will 
show how, overall. the majority of authors mentioned above were able to 
grasp the general idea about the role of the council of ministers and the 
distribution of powers under Salazar, although important nuances need to 
be clarified. The first step is to inquire whether rules are consistent with 
discourse and practice. 
The council of ministers: between formal rules, discourse 
and practice 
Salazar became head of government in July 1932, yet his convictions 
about the inefficiency of the council of ministers would only become prac-
tice in 1933, shortly before the new constitution had been enacted. In 
fact, during 1932, the press still referred to 'ordinary' meetings of the 
council of ministers - held every Friday - and 'extraordinary' meetings 
that were held under special circumstances (Ditirio de Noticias, January 
and September 1932). Hence, the established routine that characterised 
the military dictatorship since 1926 would continue for a few months 
after Salazar's appointment, until the council of ministers was transformed 
into an 'extraordinary' meeting of the whole cabinet. 
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World War, which 
altered the frequency 
of council of minister 
meetings. As for indi-
vidual meetings, the 
reader should bear in 
mind the analysis of 
1933 is based on the 
months April-July. 
3. The president of the 
republic presided 
over the council of 
ministers under the 
following circum-
stances: to address 
the national assembly 
(article 81, section 2), 
name the date of a 
general or supplemen-
tary election ( article 
81, section 3); bestow 
constituent authority 
in specific matters to 
the national assembly 
(article 81, section 
4, in the terms of 
article 134); convoke 
extraordinary meet-
ings of the national 
assembly or to 
adjourn it (article 81. 
section 5); to dissolve 
the national assem-
bly (article 81 , sect. 
6); or to pardon or 
commute sentences 
(article 81. section 8 ). 
Change came initially through discourse. If we consider Salazar's earlier 
statements, we can venture that his centralising tendency probably did not 
come as a surprise to the contemporary political elite. His 'propagandistic' 
interviews with Antonio Ferro constitute some of the earliest evidence of 
his convictions about political decision-making. In an interview in early 
December 1932, Salazar began by exposing his anti-parliamentary views: 
Even while acknowledging its necessity, parliament scares me so much that I 
am afraid of what will come out of it. Clearly there are always three months 
during which there can be good suggestions; but there are usually many 
speeches, many words. As a small parliament - which, as in the present case 
is useful and productive, the council of ministers is sufficient for me. 
(Ferro 200 3: 95) 
Then, with the enactment of the constitution, Salazar transformed his con-
victions into formal rules, namely through what was not said about the 
council of ministers. According to previous interpretations, the constitu-
tion established a 'presidential' regime centred on the prime minister: 
Salazar (Cruz 1988). The council of ministers became nothing more than a 
meeting of 'ministers ... presided over by either the president of the council 
or the president of the republic' (Caetano 1963: 539). The only constitu-
tional role attributed to the council of ministers was to nominate colonial 
governors, which may be interpreted as an expression of political centrali-
sation, since the task of appointing colonial governors should , in principle, 
belong to the minister for the colonies (Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic 1933, article 108). In effect, there was no specific section in the 
constitution dedicated to the council of ministers, and therefore no refer-
ence was made to a regular assembly of the cabinet. This aspect is notewor-
thy because it represented a formal and institutionalised break with the 
practices of the military dictatorship. 
Our hypothesis is that by establishing little more than the president 's 
conditions for presiding over the council of ministers, Salazar's concern 
was not only with constitutionally defining his relations with the cabinet, 
but also with the president of the republic, Oscar Carmona. In fact, the 
constitution states that the council of ministers should meet whenever the 
prime minister or the president judged it to be necessary (Constitution of 
the Portuguese Republic 1933, article llO). However, the president's 
'need' was also constitutionally predetermined. 3 It can be said that by con-
stitutionally enforcing cabinet meetings to deal with such issues, Salazar 
guaranteed these decisions remained under his control. In addition to for-
mal consultations with the council of state (in the case of the attribution 
of constituent powers, extraordinary meetings, postponement s and disso-
lutions), the president was obliged to call a meeting of the council of min-
isters in all cases of conflict with the assembly. However, these meetings 
were not entirely autonomous and nor were they limited to liaison with 
the prime minister: they involved the entire cabinet. Resolution of institu-
tional crises with the assembly was achieved through the implicit cooper-
ation between the president and government. 
All this contributed to the prime minister obtaining pre-eminence: it 
was the head of the executive branch, and not the government or the 
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ministers, who answered to the president. Ministerial responsibility was 
exercised jointly with the prime minister, who coordinated and directed 
their activities. The appointment and replacement of ministers and under-
secretaries was made by the president, but only on the advice of the prime 
minister, whose signature was required on all decrees. These facts indicate 
the tendency 'to transform the presidency into the nucleus of administra-
tive services and bodies that , by their nature or through practical conven-
ience, must be common to the entire government or be separated from the 
existing ministers' (Caetano 2005: 2 78), or a kind of secretariat or research 
office: 
[W]ithin the presidency of the council is assembled a set of important admin-
istrative services of information , study, research and knowledge that makes 
of them a true ministry, in which the common questions of government and 
the general problems of policy are dealt: the prime minister may delegate to 
his ministerial assistants some of his management and coordinating author-
ity as head of the presidency of the council. 
(Caetano 1963 : 531) 
Salazar' s way of reducing the council of minister's decision-making role 
was by ensuring it did not have to approve decree-laws, even when they 
had been signed by every minister (Decree-law 22470, 11 April 19 33). 
Thus, 
when the constitution says this or that matter is the responsibility of the 
government, it does not mean it needs to be exercised joint ly by the prime 
minister and his ministers: it means each minister, exercising the adminis-
trative duties of the department under h is control, possesses the authority 
constitutionally conferred on the government. 
(Caetan o 1963: 538) 
It is interesting to note that this depiction of the council of ministers was 
elaborated by Marcelo Caetano; president of the executive commission of 
the single party, the National Union (UN - Uniao Nacional), in 1947: head 
of the corporati st chamber from 1949-55, colonial minister from 1944-7 
and Salazar's successor from 1968 until the regime's overthrow on 25 
April 1974 . 
Caetano, who was one of the regime's major ideologists, and had the 
personal experience of relating with Salazar as a minister in the 1940s , 
made some recommendations when analysing the role of the council of 
ministers, which supports the idea that the centralisation of power, more 
than ideology, was a personal conviction of Salazar: 'whenever the mate-
rial involves a declaration of law, it is advisable that it be approved by the 
council of ministers, notwithstanding the fact it will later be examined by 
the competent legislative services of the presidency of the council and, 
preferably, reviewed by the corporate chamber'. That was not how Salazar 
worked, as Caetano himself would find out: ' as the signature of each min-ister was pledged individually' (Caetano 196 3: 533-4). Only for a short 
period during the 1950 s did he respond to Caetano's request by creating bi-monthly meetings; however, these did not endure. 
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Salazar's beliefs would only become stronger over time, namely after 
the end of the Second World War and the reshaping of the European polit-
ical framework. In effect, following a ministerial reshuffie in August 1940, 
Salazar highlighted the role of strong leadership. He believed the 'poor 
yield of [democratic] systems' was due mainly to what he called a waste of 
time. It is clear that, rather than as a government , he viewed his ministers 
as a group of experts with whom the leader should consult. 'Except for 
those meetings that are held to discuss either essential policy matters or to 
provide general guidance, systematic work in cabinet must be of poor 
value and low quality - in addition to the time the ministers lose.' Thus , 
compared to other political systems and regimes, the governance of the 
New State possessed clear advantages (Salazar 1943: 271 - 2). 
The best method is without doubt that which we have used for years: that 
of the head of government working with the minister or ministers whose 
portfolios are directly afTected by the problem, or of small committees that 
are constituted and with legal attributes to deal with sets of problems, as in 
the cases of the corporatist council and the council of ministers for external 
commerce. 
(Salazar 1943 : 272 ) 
The combination of formal rules and discourse leads us to conclude there 
were three main types of meetings between Salazar, his ministers and the 
inner-circle: a) exceptional meetings of the council of ministers that were 
held only on specific occasions; b) one-to-one meetings between Salazar 
and a minister to solve problems directly associated with a specific portfolio 
and policy area; and c) 'specialist councils' . We will explore the main 
characteristics of each separately. 
Meetings of the council of ministers 
During his early years as prime minister (1933-9), Salazar met his council 
of ministers on 94 days, representing an average of 15 meetings per year. 
However, the average is an insufficient instrument for this analysis, as the 
concentration of meetings during specific periods of time is one of the 
interesting features. In other words, the non-systematic gathering of the 
cabinet is one of the most important points, and one that deserves further 
elaboration. Secondly, what makes the analysis interesting is to under-
stand, on the one hand, how these meetings were distributed over time, 
and what Salazar in practice considered 'essential policy matter s and gen-
eral guidance' during the regime's early years. 
Starting with the timeline distribution, what becomes clear is the lack 
of regularity. In 1935 there were three meetings every two months, while 
during the years until 19 3 8 the cabinet met once each month, after 
which it averaged three meetings every four months. Figure 1 illustrates 
this tendency. 
With respect to the topics on the agenda, our observations show that 
the main subjects discussed at the meetings ranged from current affairs 
(52 per cent) to debate over political reform (13 per cent), social and 
political domestic crises (24 per cent) and international politics {11 per 
cent) . If we put together the three 'exceptional' topics (political reform, 
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Figure 1. 
social and political crises and internat ional politics - the latter including 
only the topics relating to the political context and conflicts in inter-war 
Europe), the interpretation becomes slightly different. On this first attempt 
to evaluate council of ministers' agenda during this period, we can tenta-
tively conclude that only 52 per cent of the meetings were dedicated to 
current affairs, i.e., approximately half of the times Salazar decided to 
gather the whole cabinet, someth ing 'exceptional' was on the table. This 
suggests Salazar met his cabinet not so much to handle 'essential policy 
matters', but on urgent matters of 'general guidance'. What we still do 
not know is whether there was any real deliberation, or if the meetings 
were merely to provide a formal endorsement of Salazar's decisions. 
The average of monthly meetings in 1933, after Salazar was 
appointed head of government for the second time, is the highest of this 
initial period of the New State. From the promulgation of the constitu-
tion until the end of 1933, Salazar met his council of ministers on aver-
age twice a month. This was probably in part due to a 'legacy' of the 
military dictatorship (his predecessor had a regular Friday appointment 
with the ent ire cabinet), but primarily it expresses Salazar's decision to 
get the approval of the whole cabinet on the several stages of the 
regime's institutionalisation. On the table were the corporatist organi-
sation of the state, the administrative code and the electoral rules. 
Current issues relating to the colonies and the agricultural cereal regime 
were also discussed. 
Political reform and Domestic social 
Current affairs* institutionalisation and political crises 




• This category includes foreign affairs as both a governmental and policy area. It is distinct 
from wha t is classified as 'international politics', which includes contextual concerns typical of 
the inter-war period. 
Note: Categories were created according to the information provided by Salazar in his diary. 
When the information was insufficient, other sources were used. 
Table 1: Topics discussed at the council of ministers by category (%). 
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In 19 34 the corporatist organisation was still being debated, but what is 
most striking about the meetings of the council of ministers in thi s year -
which were significantly less frequent than in previous or succeeding years -
was Salazar's decision to involve his cabinet in the man agemen t of all 
domestic social and political crises. Wh y would a strong dictator. a non -char-
ismatic leader, a face-to-face reduced-inner-circle governor, decide to gather 
his ministers to make decisions on what to do with the opposition to the 
regime? Beginning with the major trade union strike against the corporati st 
organisation and in support of free labour movements (18 January 1934 ) and 
ending with the threat represented by Rolao Preto 's blue shirt movement, 
Salazar brought them all to the council of ministers. After the latt er episode, 
the cabinet appeared to be some sort of instrument to legitimise the powers of 
the dictator. One day after Preto confronted Salazar by directly addressing 
him in a protest letter (following which he and his deputy , Alberto Monsaraz, 
were exiled to Spain), the cabinet met to show its support for Salazar. 
In 19 35, the opposition to the regime , which includ ed the wor king 
class movement , the Integralists and the Freemasons , was again a major 
concern for Salazar, whose diary indicat es actual measure s were discussed 
with his ministers, including the idea of purging the publi c admini stration 
and forcing the mo st prominent leader s into exile. 
The international situation becam e of pressing concern to Salazar in 
19 36 . One of the most inter est ing observations is perhaps the chang e of 
topics from 1936 to 1937. In May 1936 Salazar dismissed the minister of 
war and took over the portfolio himself. A few month s later , in Novembe r, 
Salazar also took over th e ministry of foreign affairs. This seems to have had 
an impact on the already reduced role of the council of min isters. By 19 3 7, 
despite the outcome of the Spanish civil war remaining uncertain and the 
remilitari sat ion of the Rhineland, concerns over existing and poten tial con-
flicts were no longer of central importance to the council of mini ster s. This 
is even more striking when we note that on 19 February 193 7, Salazar met 
some trusted colleagues - the mini ster of the interior , Mario Pais de Sousa, 
the minister of justice, Rodrigues Junior , and the secretary-general of the 
foreign mini stry, Teixeira de Sampaio - to discuss (without the involvement 
of the council of ministers) the introduction of a regulati on to prohibit 
Portuguese citizens from becoming involved in the civil war in Spain. 
From 1938 until the end of the period being studied, int ernational pol-
itics remained outside the political agenda , despite the ongoing nature of 
the civil war in Spain and the steady mar ch of Europe to war. New mat-
ters relating to the regime's opposition were dealt with, as were several 
minor issues , such as ship tran sport for the colonies and the preparations 
for the 1940 world exhibition in Lisbon. 
The analysis of the frequ ency of meetings and the council of ministers' 
agenda indicates both the unwillingness of Salazar to gather the whole 
cabinet on a regular basis, and his decision to deprive it of decision-making 
power: particularly in respect to current political affairs . As suggested by 
Salazar's own declarations, and in order to accurately examine the extent 
of his political centralisation, the question remains whether the Portuguese 
dictator formed smaller and restricted councils of mini sters, or held 
individual meetings at which he discussed the matters of each portfoli o in a 
more efficient and deliberate manner. 
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Meetings between the prime minister and his ministers 
The period April 19 3 3-May 19 3 9 provides elements for rethinking both 
the distribution of power during the regime's institutionalisation and the 
importance Salazar attributed to various ministerial portfolios. More pre-
cisely, we believe that the frequency with which Salazar met with his min-
isters individually partly explains both how much he sought to control the 
issues and the degree of autonomy granted to the minister. Following the 
analysis of individual meetings between Salazar and his ministers - once 
again based on his personal notes - our research shows it is possible to 
group the ministries as follows: (1) the most important: interior; (2) the 
intermediate: commerce and industry, public works and foreign affairs 
(until Salazar assumed personal control); (3) of little importance: agricul-
ture, navy and colonies; and ( 4) of residual importance: justice, war and 
education. Table 2 illustrates this. 
The most important portfolio was clearly that of the interior ministry, 
although only from 1936, when Mario Pais de Sousa took control of the 
office. Salazar reshuffied this ministry three times between 19 3 3 and 
1936, 4 and during those initial three years the frequency of meetings with 
each minister suggests that not every portfolio had the same importance. 
Salazar met with the first interior ministers just as much as he did with the 
ministers of justice, war and education. This first case shows that the diffi-
culty in analysing the importance of portfolios vis-a-vis ministers is due to 
the fact that the frequency of meetings with ministers did not always reflect 
the extent of their ability to act autonomously or the extent of their involve-
ment in the decision-making process. Although it is undeniable that the 
interior ministry was a highly important portfolio in the New State, the 
individual who held the position was also, in this case, important.; 
Commerce and industry was the next most important portfolio in terms 
of the regularity of its meetings with Salazar.6 Indeed, until the outbreak 
of the Spanish civil war in 1936, this was apparently the most important 
ministry in terms of the contact time the minister had with Salazar . 
However, it is curious to note the minister who held this office until 1936 
was not only an important figure in the initial construction of the corpo-
ratist organisation (which was a major feature of Salazar's regime), he 
was also the person to whom Salazar turned 'for counsel over matters 
related to Spain and for the establishment of links with Franco, using his 
personal connections with Gil Robles' (Alexandre 2000: 207). 
Next in the order of importance came the ministry of public works and 
communications. Except for the period 1936-8, this ministry was headed 
by Duarte Pacheco, a man who was close to Salazar. Despite the intensity 
of the legislative activity of the latter, the prime minister clearly preferred 
the epistolary exchange instead of face-to-face meetings that he would 
keep with the former. In 1938, the number of meetings with the minister 
of public works increased to such an extent that they supplanted those 
with the minister for commerce and industry. 
Curiously, the ministry of foreign affairs - which Salazar took control 
of in 19 3 6 - was treated with less importan ce during the first three years. 
The personal profiles of the holders of these offices perhaps explain this 
difference (Caeiro da Mata [1933 - 5] and Armindo Monteiro [1935-6]). It 
seems Salazar acted as the holder of this portfolio from the outset, although 
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4. The first was Albino 
dos Reis (1933). who 
was appointed during 
the military dicta-
torship, the second 
was Gomes Pereira 
(1933-4) and the 
third was Linhares de 
Lima (1934- 6). 
5. It would seem 
Caetano's conten -
tion that there was 
a group of portfolios 
with easier personal 
access to the head of 
government , while 
there were others 
that were restricted 
to brief meetings . tel-
ephone conversations 
and written corre -
spondence, does not 
seem to be sustain-
able (Caetano 2000: 
313-9) . 
6. During the period 
being studied , this 
ministry was headed 
by Sebastiao Garcia 
Ramirez (1933-6), 
Teot6n io Pereira 
(1936-7) and Costa 
Leite (1937-40). 
Total 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Portfolio 
Albino dos Reis 14 Interior 
Gomes Pereira 25 Int erior 
Linhares de Lima 19 Int erior 
Pais de Sousa 828 Interior 
Manuel Rodrigues 76 4 21 12 Justice 
Luis Alberto de 22 9 8 War 
Oliveira 
Passos e Sousa 30 
-
7 War 
Mesquita 71 7 23 Navy 
Guimaraes 
Ortins de 79 Navy 
Bettencourt 
Caeiro da Mata 69 Foreign 
Mesquita 4 Foreign 
Guimaraes 
Arminda 131 10 22 46 so Foreign/ 
Monteiro Colonies 
Duarte Pacheco 285 27 so 47 6 Public works 
Joaquim Silva 23 0 0 0 16 0 Public works 
Abranches 
Bossa 19 Colonies 
Francisco (Vieira) 76 Colonies 
Machado 
Cordeiro Ramos 2 Education 
Sousa Pinto 30 Education 
Manuel Rodrigues Education 
Eusebio Tamagnini 26 Education 
Carneiro Pacheco 56 Education 
Garcia Ramirez 258 Commerce 
and industry 
Teot6nio Pereira 206 Commerce 
and industry 
Costa Leite 183 Commerce 
and industry 
Queimadode 14 Agriculture 
Sousa 
Neves Duque 156 Agriculture 
Prior to holding 
office 
As under -secretary 
As minister 
After holding office 
Interim for more 
than one month 
Table 2: Meetings with ministers before, during and after holding office. 
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he did not officially assume responsibility until November 1936. Given 
that, it is clear foreign affairs was an important portfolio. 
The departments of justice, agriculture, navy and colonies were rooted 
at a regularly low level throughout this period. Once again, this analysis 
considers whether the lack of meetings between Salazar and other senior 
government officials may have a linear and immediate significance: the 
prime minister's devaluation of certain portfolios. In this case, it is impor-
tant to review the activities of the minister of justice, Manuel Rodrigues 
Junior, who was the longest serving minister of this period (1932-40). As 
far as can be ascertained, Rodrigues Junior had substantial decision-making 
powers. It was he who proceeded with important legal reforms such as the 
reorganisation of the Superior Council of the Justiciary (CSJ - Conselho 
Superior Judiciario) in 1933, who elaborated the electoral law in 1934 
and promulgated the decree outlining sanctions for serving with an enemy 
in 1935. The few meetings he had with Salazar were concerned mainly 
with the domestic political situation. 
In this way it is possible to conclude that a minister's profile was the 
determining factor in relation to the number of meetings they were able to 
have with the prime minister. This can be supported through an analysis of 
the number of meetings Salazar held with those who had previously exer-
cised ministerial functions and those who were yet to rise to ministerial 
office. Those who were closest to Salazar were those who met him more 
often. Garcia Ramirez, Duarte Pacheco and Teot6nio Pereira continued to be 
heard after they had left office. Another main criterion that facilitated 
face-to-face meetings with Salazar was technical competence. Falling into 
this category were the minister of public works and the minister of commerce, 
with both holding the office longer than any other. In both cases, it is worth 
highlighting the fact that Salazar did not end the face-to-face meetings and 
conversations after they were replaced. With the former, all of the meetings 
were on the matter of public works, and only rarely were they related to 
Lisbon municipal council (of which Pacheco was mayor 1936-8) . With the 
latter, meetings between the two were frequent even before 1932. 
The same can also be said of Pedro Teot6nio Pereira who, as an under-
secretary of state, had more meetings with Salazar than the minister of 
justice, Manuel Rodrigues. Thus, the claim made by Teot6nio Pereira as 
he recalled his time as under-secretary of state for corporations, that 'the 
prime minister adopted a system of working individually with each minis-
ter that meant he had very little free time in which to organise his weekly 
schedule,' is unlikely to be true (Pereira 1972: 109). 
Finally, we note Salazar held more meetings with the director-general of 
public accounts, Antonio Jose Malheiro, than he did with the under-secre-
tary of state for finances. The same was true of the secretary-general of the 
ministry of foreign affairs, who had almost as many meetings with the 
prime minister as the portfolio's ministers. What we do not know is if these 
meetings took place with the minister's consent or approval. 
As for the 'mini-council of ministers', it is true Salazar met with two or 
three ministers at a time to discuss matters that could interest several 
ministries. Some of the most important examples are: meetings with the 
ministers of foreign affairs and of commerce (together with the general 
secretary of foreign affairs) to discuss commercial agreements with France 
Political decision-making in the Portuguese New State (1933-39) 95 
7. There are occasions 
during which Salazar 
travels to his home-
town and does not 
take his usual notes. 
According to other 
sources, meetings 
with ministers and his 
inner-circle did take 
place when Salazar 
was in Santa Comba 
Dao (Matos 2003). 
However, we believe 
these lacunae are not 
sufficient to alter our 
general conclusions . 
8. According to the 
Diclomirio de hlst6ria do 
Estado Novo, Sampaio 
'was the right hand of 
all foreign ministers, 
wh o rarely made 
a decision without 
first seeking his opin-
ion, and he always 
accompanied them 
when they met with 
the head of govern-
men t' . 'From 1935 , 
wh en Salazar began 
to pay more attention 
to the intern ational 
situation, it was with 
the bard-working 
Sampaio that he met 
to establish the broad 
lines of the regime's 
foreign policy' (Rosas 
and Brito 1996: 876). 
and the Netherlands (1934) and with Spain (1936); meetin gs with the min-
isters of agriculture and of commerce, both in 1934 and 19 35, to discuss 
specific decree-laws related to these ministri es; meetings with the ministers 
of justice and of the interi or (often with the head of the political police) to 
deal with the political crises and measures to deal with political prison ers. 
This overview of Salazar 's meetings with ministers demon strate s that in 
many cases he preferred individu al and small-group meetin gs to 'wasting 
time' by gatherin g the whole cabinet. However, we do not yet possess enough 
information on the natur e of the deliberations that took place in these meet-
ings. In this sense, it is import ant to note that conclusions about Salazar's 
meeting s with men he tru sted - be they ministers, holders of other political 
offices, or mere friends - are limited to often insufficient sources. 
Below we will provide an appr oxima te idea of the formal and informal 
structures of power without suggesting definite conclusion s. This final 
part is dedicated to other trusted men who did not hold mini sterial rank, 
but of who m it is important to be aware if one seeks to under stand 
decision -makin g in Salazar's state. 
Other political officials and their fri endships with Salazar7 
In term s of positions below mini sterial rank, the most notew orthy indi-
vidual aro und Salazar was Teixeira de Sampaio (secretary-ge nera l of the 
mini stry of foreign affairs).8 Alth oug h they did not meet often (Sampaio 
was in London, where he was ambassador, for mu ch of the time) , they 
remain ed in contact by telephone an d telegram. 
During this period, the rank of under-secretary of state was immediately 
below that of minister. Our research indicates that in the majority of cases 
neither these offices, nor the individuals who held them (e.g., Leovigildo 
Franco de Sousa , Aguedo de Oliveira, Vaz Serra and F..spregueira Mendes) 
were particularly close to Salazar or important for decision-making. The three 
exceptions were those of corporati ons, occupied by Teot6nio Pereira (19 3 3-6 ), 
finances, and war - two of Salazar's own portfolios. Costa Leite occupied the 
former from 1934-7, while Santos Costa served in the latter between 1936 
and 1944. It is worth noting that the individual often made a difference . 
Unsurprisingl y, nei ther the national assembly nor the corporatist 
chamb er seems to ha ve been important to Salazar. This assertio n is based 
on the numb er of times he met their respective presidents. As prim e min -
ister, he met national assem bly president, Jose Alberto dos Reis, only 31 
times between April 1933 and May 1939, and met corporat ist chamb er 
president Eduardo Marqu es ten t imes over a similar period. 
However, Anto nio Ferro, director of the National Propaganda Secretariat 
(SPN - Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional ), was constantly at the prime 
minister's side. It is worth noting that there was no ministry of propaganda, 
an d nor was ther e any under-secretariat. 
The number of times Salazar held meetings with the leaders of the UN 
and the Portugue se Youth (MP - Mocidade Portuguesa) is not menti oned. 
The only exception to thi s was Costa Leite who, as well as being president of 
the Portugu ese Legion 's (LP - Legiao Portugu esa) central committe e from 
19 3 6-44, was also und er-secretary of stat e and then minister of finance . 
Table 3 highlights one aspect of our analysis that is difficult to measure: 
the exercise of informal power by those who surr ound ed Salazar. In thi s 
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"' S2. Total 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Position g. 
a Aguedo de Oliveira 1 Finances under-secretary to 23 Oct 1934 
0.. 
"' Vaz Serra 2 Finances under-secretary from 13 Dec 19 3 5 n i;;· 
5· Public works under-secretary from 7 Jun 
::l 
3 Espregueira Mendes 0 19 38-6 Sep 1944; Communications under-secretary from 6 Jun 
Ill ~ 1944-4 Feb 194 7 
::l (JQ Santos Costa 396 War under-secretary from 12 May 1936 s· 
s- Teixeira de Sampaio 803 9 22 28 116 262 249 117 Foreign affairs secretary general. 
"' Fezas Vital 77 2 13 20 22 17 1 2 Jurist and university professor 
"' 0 ~ Antonio Ferro 131 7 18 23 22 14 35 12 National Propaganda Bureau (SPN) director i:: (JQ 
Jose Nosolini 73 3 12 15 11 13 16 3 UN leader, governor of Funchal i:: 
"' <II 
"' Nobre Guedes 19 0 9 2 4 2 2 0 UN and MP leader z 
"' Oscar Carmona 66 4 14 8 15 5 17 3 President of the republic ~ 
~ 
Ill Jose Alberto dos Reis 31 2 1 11 9 5 3 0 President of the nationa l assembly from 19 3 5 
f. Eduardo Marques 10 0 0 4 2 3 1 0 President of the corporatist chamber from 19 3 5 
-;::; 
"' Antonio Jose w 338 32 69 119 34 55 29 0 Treasury director general w Malheiro I 
w 
:B Namorado de Aguiar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Commander-general of the LP from 19 3 6 
Casimiro Teles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Commander-general of the LP from 19 3 7 





'l While in office 
-Table 3: Meetings with other political office holders. 
9. Salazar was also 
close to other people, 
although he saw 
them a great deal less 
often: Serras e Silva 
(2 7 times): Sebastiiio 
Garcia Ramirez (18): 
Teixeira de Sampaio 
(18); Jose Nosolini 
(his political advi-
sor who held several 
political and admin-
istrative offices): 
Duarte Pacheco (11): 
Nunes Mexia (eight); 
Teot6nio Pereira 
(seven); Mario de 
Figueiredo (seven); 
Cardinal Manuel 
Cerejeira (six) and ; 
Diniz da Fonseca 
(five). We can also 
add the names of 
Carneiro de Mesquita 
and Josue Trocado, 
whom Salazar met 
frequently to attend 
Sunday mass . 
group, we include people who did not hold any particular political office, but 
who often spent informal time with Salazar, in many cases gossiping about 
politics. The most noteworthy of these were Bissaia Barreto, the Lacerda 
family, Mario Pais de Sousa and Jose Antonio Marques. The common factor 
among them is their background: they were all from Coimbra, the city in 
which Salazar graduated and the university at which he taught. 
Of these, the name of Bissaia Barreto is significant. Barreto was a 
deputy in the constituent republican assembly of 1911 when he repre-
sented the Evolutionist Party. He was a freemason and a member of the 
Coimbra Carbonaria, and joined the UN when it was formed in 1930, 
becoming a member of its central commission on 5 July 1932. He was 
also appointed procurator of the corporatist chamber in 19 61. His 
republican origins led many to believe he represented 'the New State 's 
main republican guarantee'. Salazar lunched with Barreto no fewer than 
186 times during the period being studied, and was recorded as being in 
the prime minister's company no fewer than 195 times. 
We should also note the case of Jeronimo Lacerda, who graduated from 
the University of Coimbra where he became a lecturer in the medicine 
faculty. He founded the Caramulo sanatorium and headed the UN's dis-
trict commission in Tondela. In total, members of the Lacerda family met 
Salazar informally 89 times between April 1933 and May 1939. 
Salazar's sister's brother-in-law, Mario Pais de Sousa, had 76 informal 
meetings with the prime minister. Pais de Sousa was a law graduate and 
a member of the Christian Democracy Academic Centre (CADC - Centro 
Academico de Democracia Crista) that emerged from the republican 
Liberal Republican Union (ULR - Uniao Liberal Republicana). He had 
supported the 28 May coup in 1926 , and served as interior minister dur-
ing the consequent military dictatorship. He went on to become a leader 
of the UN and a deputy in the national assembly. Under Salazar he served 
as interior minister from 18 January 1936 to 6 September 1944. 
Finally, there was Jose Antonio Marques. Marques, who was from Santa 
Comba Dao, had abandoned the priesthood before graduating in law from 
the University of Coimbra - where he was one of Salazar's contemporaries -
in 1911. He had served as mayor of Santa Comba Dao, under-director at 
the office of the Supreme Court of Justice {STJ - Supremo Tribunal de 
Justic;:a) and as a deputy in the national assembly (Brochado 198 7: 138-9). 
Salazar met Marques informally 38 times; however, if we are to calculate 
the number of times these men were together, we reach a figure of 293. 9 
These statistics place in doubt the idea that dominant interest s sought 
to influence Salazar and his political decisions informally. It is important 
to highlight the names that one would expect to appear frequently, based 
on existing literature and research about Salazar: Cardinal Cerejeira, Diniz 
da Fonseca and Mario de Figueiredo who, according to his diary, had very 
few meetings with Salazar. This is even more surprising if we bear in mind 
they were all personal friends of Salazar from the CADC. 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion leads to the idea that if 'Salazar created the single 
party ... from above, ensuring it remained weak and elitist from its very 
foundations in 1930' (Pinto 2002: 413), the same happened with his 
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ministers. The records of Salazar's meetings with the ministerial elite 
support the notion he was a 'strong dictator', not because he was a char-
ismatic leader, but due to his 'extensive centralisation of decision-making' 
(Pinto 2002: 413). However, although the single-party and the cabinet 
were, in practice, very weak institutions in terms of decision-making 
power, Salazar did have his personal counsellors - some of whom were 
appointed ministers at a certain moment - which created a certain 
confusion between public office and personal trust that is not always easy 
to disentangle. 
However, it is important to note that these conclusions do not cover 
the entire duration of Salazarism. Franco Nogueira, who as well as being 
Salazar's official biographer was minister of foreign affairs 1961-9, noted 
the existence of different phases during which cabinet meetings were held 
with some regularity: in 1951 'his conviction that the work of the cabinet 
in plenary was of limited use took root' and 'he returned to his habit of 
working with each minister individually' (Nogueira 1977: 208, 212). 
During the initial period of Salazar's rule the analysis shows that, with 
respect to the council of ministers, there was no government routine and 
neither was there any regularity of meetings. There was nothing similar 
to Mussolini's grand council, which met on the 12th day of each month 
(see Adinolfi's article in this journal). It would appear Salazar's cabinet 
was little more than a crisis management committee in which meetings 
were determined by the situation. 
As for the ministers, everything indicates that - with the exception of 
the interior ministry - meetings had more to do with general policy than 
with matters for which the ministries were responsible. Thus, in portfolios 
such as the ministry of justice, meetings with the ministers were mainly 
consultative. The technical competence of the ministers was more highly 
valued than their political charges: examples of this include those of 
Malheiro, Fezas Vital, Santos Costa, Teixeira de Sampaio, Rafael Duque 
and Duarte Pacheco. Political experience was also valued - and not neces-
sarily at the head of any particular ministry. Examples include Garcia 
Ramirez, Pais de Sousa and Teot6nio Pereira. As for the informal level, 
those who were close to Salazar were not generally politicians, and the 
political duties they performed were more that of interlocutors, since 
Salazar favoured technical competence and political and personal trust. 
Although conclusions are not particularly striking, they do contribute 
to enhancing the accuracy of what is known of Salazar's style of govern-
ing. While Pinto sustains the council of ministers gathered 'only when 
there were major external or domestic policy issues that required demon-
strations of a united front for the nation' (Pinto 2002: 433), this analysis 
of Salazar's personal notes shows the council of ministers was called to 
pronounce on issues that required swift responses, and not necessarily on 
policy issues. Examples include the trade union opposition of 1934, the 
outbreak of the civil war in Spain in 19 3 6, the bomb attacks of 19 3 7 and 
the alleged conspiracies against the regime in 1938. 
What then can be said of the Portuguese case in the light of current 
knowledge of the allocation of political power in 20th-century dictator-
ships? Franco's Spain seems to be one European dictatorship in which the 
council of ministers played the predominant decision-making role. 
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According to Jerez Mir, being a trusted minister of Franco meant empow-
erment and a high degree of autonomy (except in such portfolios as inter-
nal security and external affairs) (see Jerez Mir's article in this journal ). 
Our research indicates Portugal was different. 
The lack of a pattern of decision-making allocation in the fascist-era 
dictatorships transform s the generalisation of single cases into a bold ta sk. 
Moreover, different methodological approaches seem to highlight the exist-
ence of competing interpr etations between centralisation, empowerment 
and decision-making: namely, in the actual case of dictatorial regimes. 
Some authors have concluded that on some occasions, ministerial recru it-
ment may be a strategy to keep an individual und er control instead of 
empowering them, or to give representation to informal 'political families'. 
However, if the New State was more similar to Francoism than it was to 
Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany (Pinto 1996), this is one of the dimensions 
in which this does not hold true. In fact, despite surrounding himself with 
competent minister s, Salazar refused to allow them anyth ing bu t the 
smallest margin of autonomous decision-making. 
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